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 1 
	
When	a	small	country	votes	No,	the	small	country	has	a	problem.	When	a	big	country	
votes	No,	the	European	Union	has	a	problem.1	
–	Jacob	Buksti	
	
If	voters	are	asked	to	vote	twice	on	the	same	issue	in	a	single	year,	why	might	they	initially	reject	
the	 proposal	 but	 then	 vote	 to	 approve	 it	 the	 second	 time?	 This	 has	 happened	 three	 times	 in	
European	Union	 (EU)	 referendums,	 in	Denmark	 (Maastricht	Treaty	or	TEU	 in	1992-1993)	and	 in	
Ireland	(Nice	Treaty	in	2001-2002	and	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2008-2009),	as	Table	1	demonstrates.	
Table	1	here	
	
Double	 referendums	 take	 place	 only	when	 the	 proposal	 is	 about	 treaty	 ratification	 and	 only	 in	
small	member	states.	Bigger	member	states	such	as	France	can	–	at	 least	temporarily	–	put	the	
brakes	on	the	integration	project	when	their	public	rejects	a	treaty.	The	smaller	member	states	go	
back	 to	 their	 public	 to	 persuade	 them	 in	 second	 referendums,	which	 have	 all	 been	 successful.	
Such	swings	in	public	opinion	bring	up	questions	on	direct	democracy	as	to	whether	political	elites	
control	 referendum	 results	 or	 whether	 voters	 are	 capable	 of	 expressing	 their	 preferences	 in	
referendums	 (Altman,	 2010;	 Magleby,	 1984;	 Sartori,	 1987).	 Moreover,	 they	 put	 the	 future	 of	
European	integration	at	stake.		
No	 work	 has	 studied	 these	 three	 double	 referendums	 comparatively.	 The	 existing	
literature	highlights	the	vigor,	energy,	and	effectiveness	of	the	second	round	Yes	campaigns	in	the	
Maastricht	and	Nice	double	referendums	and	 identifies	 this	change	as	the	main	causal	 factor	 in	
overturning	 the	 verdicts	 (e.g.	 FitzGibbon,	 2009a,	 2009b;	 Garry	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Hobolt,	 2009;	
O'Brennan,	2003;	Qvortrup,	2005).	Yet	 these	 studies	mostly	provide	anecdotal	evidence	 for	 the	
shift	 in	campaigns.	 In	the	only	comparative,	 in-depth	analysis	of	these	two	double	referendums,	
Hobolt	 (2009)	 finds	 that	 campaign	 information	 is	 what	 changed	 the	 referendum	 result	 in	 the	
second	 rounds.	 I	 take	 a	 step	 further	 by	 bringing	 together	 all	 three	 instances	 of	 double	
referendums	 and	 by	 uncovering	 the	 concrete	 campaign	 strategies	 through	 a	 close	 analysis	 of	
                                                
1	Member	of	the	Danish	Parliament.	Social	Democratic	Party.	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
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campaign	materials	 and	detailed	 interview	data.	Campaigners	 from	different	 countries	not	only	
report	 very	 similar	 strategies	 in	 the	 first	 versus	 second	 rounds,	but	 also	acknowledge	 that	 they	
learned	 from	 the	 previous	 double	 referendum	 cases.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	
these	strategies	to	fully	understand	how	the	campaigns	mattered.		
In	 a	 referendum	 campaign,	 the	 typical	 No	 campaign	 strategy	 is	 to	 associate	 the	
referendum	 proposal	 with	 unpopular	 themes	 to	 drive	 down	 public	 support	 for	 it	 (Jerit,	 2004;	
LeDuc,	2005).	In	the	double	referendums,	this	was	indeed	the	case	in	the	first	rounds,	but	not	in	
the	second	rounds.	Based	on	38	in-depth	interviews	with	Irish	and	Danish	campaigners	and	public	
opinion	data,	I	find	that	the	Yes	side	blocked	the	No	side	from	doing	so	by	taking	two	steps	in	the	
second	rounds.	In	all	three	cases,	they	first	secured	‘reassurances’	from	the	EU	on	the	key	themes	
that	the	No	campaign	had	raised	 in	the	first	 round.	 In	a	second	step,	 they	emphasized	the	risks	
associated	with	a	second	No	vote.	Faced	with	these	new	strategies,	 the	No	campaigners’	hands	
were	 tied	 in	 the	 second	 referendums.	These	 findings	are	 important	 for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 a	
systematic	 analysis	 of	 campaign	 strategies,	 arguments,	 slogans	 and	 materials	 reveals	 the	
overlooked	 similarities	across	 cases.	 Second,	 it	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 learning	 across	 cases,	which	
has	 important	 implications.	 Given	 their	 lack	 of	 weight	 in	 the	 EU,	 small	 member	 states	 have	
developed	a	toolkit	for	reversing	public	opinion	on	EU	treaties.		
Below,	 I	 first	 summarize	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 EU	 referendum	 literature	 on	 the	 subject.	
Second,	 using	 extensive	 interview	 data,	 I	 document	 the	 campaign	 strategies.	 Finally,	 based	 on	
public	 opinion	data,	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 shift	 in	 the	Yes	 side	 strategies	helped	overturn	 the	
negative	verdicts.			
	
Understanding	EU	Referendums	
The	 EU	 referendum	 literature	 has	 been	 divided	 between	 ‘second-order’	 and	 ‘issue-voting’	
interpretations,	attributing	the	results	to	domestic	or	European	factors.	(Reif	et	al.,	1980;	Siune	et	
al.,	 1994).	 Studies	 on	 the	 Maastricht	 and	 Nice	 Treaty	 double	 votes	 fall	 into	 these	 two	 camps	
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(Franklin	et	al.,	1995;	Garry	et	al.,	2005;	Svensson,	2002).	The	first	group	argues	that	the	change	in	
the	level	of	government	popularity	caused	the	switch.	Yet	this	explanation	is	directly	challenged	
by	the	Irish	Nice	and	Lisbon	double	referendums,	as	the	governments	were	much	less	popular	in	
the	second	rounds	that	approved	the	treaties	(Sinnott	et	al.,	2010).	The	second	group	claims	that	
people’s	understanding	of	what	the	EU	treaty	means	changed	in	the	second	round.	Finding	more	
support	for	the	second	model,	recent	research	points	to	the	increasing	campaign	intensity	in	the	
second	round	referendums	(de	Vreese,	2006;	Garry	et	al.,	2005;	Hobolt,	2005).2		
Nevertheless,	what	is	missing	in	the	literature	is	an	in-depth	study	of	campaign	dynamics	
in	 these	 double	 referendums.	 For	 instance,	 studying	 the	 Nice	 double	 referendum,	 Garry	 et	 al.	
(2005)	 attribute	 the	 change	 in	 the	 result	 to	 the	 more	 intense	 and	 effective	 second	 campaign,	
which	 increased	 the	 salience	 of	 the	 issue	 and	 citizens’	 level	 of	 information.	 But	 this	 does	 not	
explain	how	exactly	the	two	campaigns	were	different.	The	measurement	of	campaign	 intensity	
and	 salience	 relies	 primarily	 on	 subjective	 assessment	 by	 individuals	 in	 survey	 questions,	 and	
campaign	effectiveness	is	based	on	anecdotal	evidence.		
Moreover,	 no	 work	 has	 compared	 all	 six	 of	 these	 referendum	 campaigns.	Most	 of	 the	
existing	research	studies	the	campaigns	either	 in	one	or	both	rounds	of	referendums	 in	a	single	
country,	 Denmark	 or	 Ireland	 (e.g.	 Gilland,	 2002;	 Hayward,	 2003;	 O'Brennan,	 2009;	 Qvortrup,	
2009,	2013;	Sinnott	et	al.,	2010;	Sinnott	et	al.,	2009;	Svensson,	1994).	Hobolt	(2009),	in	the	most	
complete	research	on	the	subject,	brings	together	four	of	the	cases	(Maastricht	and	Nice	votes)	
and	 shows	 that	 in	 the	 second	 referendum	 campaigns	 both	 the	 quantity	 and	 the	 type	 of	
information	 available	 to	 the	 public	were	 different.	 In	 the	Nice	 referendums,	 she	 finds	 that	 the	
quantity	 of	 information	 mattered.	 The	 second,	 ‘more	 intensive’	 campaign	 provided	 more	
information	and	mobilized	more	Yes	voters	to	vote.	In	the	Maastricht	referendums,	on	the	other	
                                                
2	Changes	in	campaign	intensity	or	spending	do	not	systematically	correlate	with	the	changes	in	referendum	
results.	The	literature	presents	contradictory	results	on	campaign	intensity	depending	on	the	measure	used	
(e.g.	Hobolt,	2006,	2009).	Similarly,	the	Yes	campaigns	almost	always	spend	more	than	the	No	campaigns,	
and	the	No	side	can	succeed	despite	having	fewer	resources	(de	Vreese	&	Semetko,	2004,	p.	58;	Szczerbiak	
&	Taggart,	2005.	
 4 
hand,	 the	 type	of	 information	mattered.	The	 second	campaign	 framed	 the	question	differently,	
emphasizing	the	negative	consequences	of	a	rejection.	
My	 goal	 is	 to	 bring	 together	 all	 double	 votes	 and	 systematically	 analyze	 the	 campaign	
strategies	 in	 the	 first	 and	 second	 rounds,	 uncovering	 the	 similarities	 across	 cases.	 Referendum	
campaigns	 have	 peculiar	 dynamics.	 No	 campaigners	 need	 only	 to	 raise	 doubts	 in	 the	minds	 of	
voters	and	link	the	proposal	to	other	less	popular	issues	(LeDuc,	2005).	We	would	thus	expect	the	
No	campaigners	to	use	this	strategy	in	both	rounds	of	campaigns.	 Indeed,	 in	all	three	instances,	
they	successfully	did	so	in	the	first	referendums	(Hobolt,	2009;	Sinnott	et	al.,	2009).	But	why	were	
they	not	able	to	achieve	this	in	the	second	rounds?	
	The	detailed	interview	data	shows	that	in	all	cases,	after	the	rejections,	the	governments	
sought	reassurances	 from	the	EU	on	these	politicized	themes.	This	mechanism	allowed	them	to	
ask	the	same	question	again.	Having	changed	the	context	successfully,	the	Yes	side	could	frame	
the	question	differently.	To	achieve	this	they	used	their	second	strategy,	which	was	to	raise	the	
stakes	 of	 a	 second	 rejection.	 This	 time	 the	 Yes	 side	 could	 use	 the	 risk	 factor,	which	was	more	
available	 to	 the	 No	 side	 in	 the	 first	 rounds.	 Importantly,	 Denmark	 designed	 these	 strategies,	
which	the	Irish	learned	and	adopted	later	on.	
	
The	Campaign	Strategies	
Data	
My	analysis	of	the	campaign	strategies	is	based	on	personal	interviews	with	the	campaigners	and	
on	 campaign	 materials.	 I	 conducted	 the	 field	 research	 in	 April-May	 2011	 and	 interviewed	
campaigners	 from	all	political	parties	and	civil	 society	groups	 that	were	active	 in	 the	campaign.	
These	 interviews	were	 in	 English,	 face-to-face,	 semi-structured,	 and	 based	 on	 opportunity	 and	
snowball	 sampling.	 A	 full	 list	 of	 the	 individuals	 interviewed	 and	 the	 questionnaire	 used	 are	
presented	 as	 an	 online	 appendix.	 I	 interviewed	 38	 campaigners	 (13	 from	 Denmark,	 25	 from	
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Ireland),	from	all	across	the	political	spectrum.	16	of	the	interviewees	were	campaigners	from	civil	
society,	22	were	from	political	parties;	17	were	No	campaigners,	and	21	were	Yes	campaigners.		
	
The	actors	
As	 Table	 2	 shows,	 in	 both	 Denmark	 and	 Ireland,	 an	 important	majority	 of	 the	 political	 parties	
supported	the	EU	treaties	during	these	referendum	campaigns.3		
	
Table	2	here	
	
In	addition	to	these	political	parties,	there	were	civil	society	organizations	that	participated	in	the	
campaigns.	In	Denmark,	two	important	movements,	the	People’s	Movement	against	the	EC	(both	
rounds)	and	the	June	Movement	(second	round)	campaigned	on	the	No	side.	 In	 Ireland,	 in	both	
Nice	and	Lisbon	campaigns,	the	National	Platform,	the	Peace	and	Neutrality	Alliance,	the	pro-life	
Catholic	 group	Cóir	 (Lisbon	Treaty),	 and	 the	 Libertas	 led	by	businessman	Declan	Ganley	 (Lisbon	
Treaty)	 recommended	a	No	 vote.	 In	 both	 countries	 there	were	 civil	 society	 Yes	 campaigns	 too,	
such	 as	 the	 Danish	 European	 Movement,	 Irish	 Alliance	 for	 Europe	 and	 Ireland	 for	 Europe.	
Particularly	 in	 Ireland,	 these	 civil	 society	 Yes	 campaigns	 were	 considerably	 more	 active	 in	 the	
second	 rounds,	 and	 without	 exception,	 all	 my	 Irish	 interviewees	 stressed	 that	 they	 provided	
indispensible	additional	energy.		
	
The	arguments	
In	 the	 first	 rounds	 in	 both	 countries,	 the	 No	 campaign	 arguments	 tapped	 into	 the	 sensitive	
subjects	for	the	society.	In	Denmark,	the	No	side	argued	that	the	Maastricht	Treaty	would	lead	to	
loss	 of	 Danish	 sovereignty	 in	 a	 new	 United	 States	 of	 Europe,	 which	 would	 overrule	 Danish	
currency	 and	 citizenship.	 In	 Ireland,	 in	 both	Nice	 and	 Lisbon	 referendums,	 the	No	 campaigners	
repeatedly	 argued	 that	 the	 treaties	 would	 create	 a	 European	 super-state	 and	 cause	 loss	 of	
                                                
3	While	the	government	remained	the	same	during	the	Lisbon	referendums,	 it	changed	between	the	first	
and	second	rounds	of	the	Maastricht	and	Nice	referendums.	
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sovereignty,	change	Irish	laws	on	abortion,	lead	to	loss	of	social	standards	and	military	neutrality,	
and	 finally	 that	 Ireland	 would	 lose	 its	 permanent	 EU	 Commissioner.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Nice	 No	
campaign	brought	up	the	controversial	issue	of	EU	enlargement,	whereas	the	Lisbon	No	campaign	
argued	 that	 the	 treaty	would	 undermine	 Ireland’s	 ability	 to	 set	 its	 own	 corporate	 tax	 rate	 and	
thereby	 have	 economic	 costs.	 The	 No	 campaigners	 used	 catchy	 slogans	 and	 vivid	 posters	 to	
convey	their	arguments.	In	Denmark,	‘Towards	the	United	States	of	Europe:	Vote	No!’,	‘No	to	the	
Common	 Defense’,	 ‘The	 Social	 Dimension:	 The	 What?’	 were	 among	 the	 No	 camp	 slogans.	 In	
Ireland,	the	No	side	similarly	used	slogans	such	as	‘You	Will	Lose!	Power,	Freedom,	Money!	Vote	
No	to	the	Treaty	of	Nice!’,	‘No	to	NATO,	No	to	Nice’,	‘Lisbon:	Good	for	Them,	Bad	for	Us’,	‘People	
Died	for	Your	Freedom,	Don’t	Throw	It	Away’.	Also,	in	the	first	Lisbon	campaign,	with	the	slogan	
‘Ireland	Can	Do	Better’,	 the	No	campaigners	emphasized	that	a	No	vote	would	 lead	to	a	 ‘better	
deal’,	relying	on	their	Nice	Treaty	experience.		
In	the	second	round,	however,	the	arguments	changed.	The	Yes	side	argued	that	Europe	
had	 listened	 to	 the	 Danish/Irish	 people	 and	 responded	 with	 legal	 guarantees.	 In	 line	 with	 the	
Edinburgh	Agreement,	Denmark	would	have	 four	opt-outs	 in	 the	 fields	of	European	citizenship,	
economic	and	monetary	union,	defense	policy,	and	justice	and	home	affairs.	Ireland,	on	the	other	
hand,	gained	a	guarantee	concerning	its	military	neutrality	with	the	Seville	Declaration	after	the	
Nice	 referendum.	 Once	 again,	 after	 the	 Lisbon	 referendum,	 the	 Irish	 government	 obtained	
guarantees	on	the	Irish	commissioner,	 Irish	competency	over	tax	rates,	abortion,	neutrality,	and	
workers’	rights.	In	addition	to	the	arguments	on	the	guarantees,	they	stated	the	consequences	of	
a	second	No	vote.	This	shift	was	visible	in	the	choice	of	slogans	as	well.		
In	 Denmark,	 the	 Social	 Democrats	 switched	 their	 slogan	 from	 ‘The	 North	 Has	Much	 to	
Give	to	the	EC’	in	the	first	round	to	‘With	Edinburgh	We	Start	a	New	Place’	in	the	second	round.	
The	Liberal	Party	went	 from	 ‘Vote	Yes!’	 to	 ‘Difference:	Maastricht	 -	Edinburgh’,	and	 ‘Go	 for	 the	
Safe	Choice,	You	Will	Not	Get	Another	Chance’.	 In	 Ireland	too,	the	first	rounds	saw	abstract	Yes	
slogans	such	as	 ‘Europe:	Let’s	Be	at	 the	Heart	of	 It’	or	 ‘Good	for	 Ireland,	Good	for	Europe’.	The	
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second	 rounds	witnessed	more	energized	messages.	 In	 the	 second	Nice	 referendum,	 the	 Labor	
Party	 conclusively	 put	 the	 emphasis	 on	 Europe:	 ‘Hold	 your	 Fire.	 The	 Government	 Can	 Wait.	
Europe	Can’t.	Vote	Yes’.	In	the	second	Lisbon	referendum,	the	Yes	campaign	argued:	‘Yes	to	Jobs.	
Yes	for	Ireland.	Yes	for	Our	Economy’	and	‘Ruin	versus	Recovery’.	In	return,	the	No	campaigners	
emphasized	 that	 it	 was	 exactly	 the	 same	 treaty	 and	 that	 the	 so-called	 opt-outs	 or	 guarantees	
would	 not	 be	 legally	 binding.	 In	 Denmark,	 the	 People’s	 Movement	 argued:	 ‘Not	 a	 Comma	 is	
Moved’.	 ‘Exactly	 the	 Same	 Treaty	 as	 Last	 Year’,	 added	 the	 Progress	 Party.	 In	 Ireland,	 Libertas	
similarly	used	the	slogan:	 ‘It	Seems	We	Need	to	Tell	Them	Twice.	Same	Old	Government,	Same	
Old	Treaty,	Same	Straight	Answer.	No.’.	Figure	1	demonstrates	 these	differences	by	providing	a	
sample	of	campaign	posters.	In	each	mini	figure	the	top	row	presents	the	first	round	posters,	and	
the	bottom	row	the	second	round	ones.	
Figure	1	here	
	
Understanding	the	strategies		
The	first	campaign	
Without	exception,	all	Yes	campaigners	acknowledged	that	the	No	side	effectively	raised	doubts	
in	 the	minds	 of	 Danish	 and	 Irish	 voters	 in	 the	 first	 rounds.	 In	Denmark,	Niels	 Helveg	 Petersen,	
Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	(1993),	stated	that	the	first	campaign	was	badly	managed	from	the	Yes	
side.4	 Erik	Boel,	 President	of	 the	European	Movement,	 similarly	 said:	 ‘The	Yes	 side	 thought	 the	
Danes	would	vote	Yes	anyway,	because	they	had	never	voted	No’.5	Jørgen	Ørstrøm	Møller	of	the	
Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 agreed:	 ‘We	 took	 it	 for	 granted.	 Almost	 all	 opinion	 polls	 before	 the	
referendum	indicated	that	it	would	be	a	Yes.	...	When	the	campaign	evolved	it	dawned	on	us	that	
a	No	was	possible.	Then	it	became	difficult,	almost	impossible	to	create	a	new	strategy’.6	Minister	
of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 (1992)	 Uffe	 Ellemann-Jensen	 stated	 his	 frustration:	 ‘If	 you	 have	 a	 very	
aggressive	No	campaign	and	a	 lot	of	wimps	on	the	Yes	side	who	would	rather	say	“Oh,	no!	This	
                                                
4	Interview,	2	May	2011.	
5	Interview,	11	May	2011.	
6	Interview,	10	May	2011.	
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will	not	happen”,	the	skeptical	Danes	will	vote	No’.7	On	the	No	side,	Socialist	People’s	Party	MP	
Steen	Gade	stressed	the	same	point:	‘The	first	Yes	campaign’s	bottom	line	was	“it	will	not	be	as	
bad	as	you	believe”,	they	lacked	an	offensive	line’.8	
In	 Ireland,	 Fine	 Gael	 MP	 Lucinda	 Creighton	 said:	 ‘Both	 of	 the	 first	 campaigns	 were	
characterized	by	an	expectation	 that	 they	would	be	carried.	There	wasn’t	 a	 very	 significant	Yes	
campaign	...	and	there	wasn’t	a	whole	lot	of	information	made	available	to	the	public’.9	National	
Campaign	Coordinator	of	the	Ireland	for	Europe	Brendan	Halligan	agreed:	‘In	both	occasions,	the	
Yes	 side	 practically	 had	 no	 campaign	 the	 first	 time	 and	 then	 mounted	 a	 huge	 campaign	 the	
second	 time’.10	 Déirdre	 de	 Búrca	 of	 the	 Green	 Party	 described	 the	 first	 Yes	 campaigns	 in	 both	
double	 referendums	 as	 lackadaisical	 and	 lethargic,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 No	 sides	 which	 she	
characterized	 as	 passionate	 and	 focused	 on	 the	 details	 of	 the	 treaty.11	 Dick	 Roche,	Minister	 of	
Europe,	similarly	explained	that	the	Yes	side	lacked	the	energy,	the	enthusiasm,	and	the	passion	
that	the	No	side	put	in,	stressing	the	strength	of	the	No	campaign	posters.12	Joe	Costello,	Labour	
Party	MP,	repeated	the	same	point:13	
The	 first	 [Yes]	 campaign	 was	 a	 disaster.	 …	 There	 was	 a	 general	 expectation	 that	 it	
would	 pass	 without	 putting	 any	 effort	 or	money	 in.	 …	 There	 was	 a	 very	 good	 anti-
Lisbon	campaign	run,	very	effective.	 It	played	on	people’s	fears,	by	and	large	fears	of	
European	army,	fears	of	too	much	power	going	to	Europe,	loss	of	sovereignty,	loss	of	
corporate	tax	rate.	
	
Both	Danish	and	 Irish	No	campaigners	explained	 that	 they	were	 intentionally	 specific	 in	
their	 argumentation.	 In	 Denmark,	 Jens-Peter	 Bonde,	 President	 of	 the	 June	Movement,	 stated:	
‘The	 task	 was	 to	 change	 the	 agenda	 from	 common	market	 to	 a	 discussion	 about	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
political	project.	 ...	Union	was	a	very	negative	word	 in	Denmark’.14	Ole	Krarup,	President	of	 the	
People’s	 Movement	 against	 the	 EU,	 agreed:	 ‘The	 central	 point	 was	 that	 with	 the	 Maastricht	
                                                
7	Interview,	10	May	2011.	
8	Interview,	5	May	2011.	
9	Interview,	19	April	2011.	
10	Interview,	11	April	2011.	
11	Interview,	14	April	2011.	
12	Interview,	27	April	2011.	
13	Interview,	15	April	2011.	
14	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
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Treaty	they	were	creating	the	first	steps	of	a	Union’.15	Søren	Krarup	of	the	Progress	Party	stressed	
that	they	wanted	to	protect	the	Danish	krone.16	To	demonstrate	this	argument,	they	prepared	a	
book	entitled	‘For	the	Crown	and	the	Country’,	where	crown	had	a	double	meaning,	the	currency	
and	the	monarchy.		
In	 Ireland,	 Naoise	 Nunn,	 Executive	 Director	 of	 Libertas,	 compared	 the	 No	 campaign	 to	
guerilla	warfare:	‘You	picked	one	little	issue	on	which	there	was	some	doubt	and	contention,	and	
then	you	sold	and	created	enough	doubt	in	the	minds	of	the	audience,	and	the	Yes	campaigners	
were	 struggling,	 backpedalling,	 trying	 to	 explain,	 and	 when	 they	 were	 explaining	 they	 were	
losing’.17	For	instance,	President	of	Libertas	Declan	Ganley	opposed	the	Lisbon	Treaty	because	it	
would	 lead	 to	 ‘unaccountable	 government’.18	 To	 explain	 this	 concept	 to	 the	 people,	 Libertas	
designed	a	poster	showing	the	Irish	proclamation	of	independence	as	void.	In	his	words:	‘How	do	
you	 capture	 this	 idea	 in	 something	 that	 has	 popular	 resonance?	 Everybody	 recognizes	 the	
proclamation	of	independence’.		
The	 Yes	 campaigners	 explained	 the	 difficulties	 they	 had	 in	 responding	 to	 these	 No	
campaign	arguments.	In	Denmark,	Jørgen	Ørstrøm	Møller	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	said:	
‘The	No	campaign	has	an	easier	task	because	they	appeal	to	the	fears,	anxiety,	uncertainties,	and	
emotions.	Many	said	they	were	against	the	Euro	because	they	would	like	to	keep	the	portrait	of	
the	Queen	on	 the	coins.	How	can	you	argue	against	 such	an	argument?’.19	Charlotte	Antonsen,	
Liberal	Party	MP,	brought	up	the	same	problem:	‘The	more	we	defended	and	explained	ourselves,	
the	more	complicated	it	got’.20	Mogens	Lykketoft,	Social	Democrat	MP,	agreed:	‘It	was	easy	to	say	
that	our	sovereignty	would	be	taken	away’.21	In	Ireland,	Karen	White,	member	of	Irish	Alliance	for	
Europe,	 similarly	explained:	 ‘If	 you	are	on	 the	No	 side,	 you	can	appeal	 to	different	groups	with	
                                                
15	Interview,	6	May	2011.	
16	Interview,	12	May	2011.	
17	Interview,	12	April	2011.	
18	Interview,	20	April	2011.	
19	Interview,	10	May	2011.	
20	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
21	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
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different	messages.	We	had	to	counter	all	these	different	arguments’.22	 	Lucinda	Creighton,	Fine	
Gael	MP,	also	argued	that	it	was	difficult	because	‘people	needed	only	one	good	reason	to	vote	
against’.23		
More	specifically,	the	Yes	side	criticized	the	No	side	for	creating	diversions	in	the	debate.	
In	Denmark,	Niels	Helveg	Petersen,	Minister	of	 Foreign	Affairs	 (1993),	brought	up	 the	No	camp	
argument	that	if	the	treaty	had	passed,	there	would	have	been	police	forces	of	other	EU	countries	
on	 Danish	 streets.24	 Jacob	 Buksti,	 Social	 Democrat	MP,	 added:	 ‘Even	worse,	 German	 police!	 ...	
There	were	deep-rooted	elements	there,	such	as	the	German	invasion	in	the	1940s’.25	Most	of	the	
campaigners	 recalled	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 EU’s	 ban	 on	 crooked	 cucumbers	 as	 well.	 In	 Ireland,	
similarly,	Timmy	Dooley,	Fianna	Fáil	MP,	 stated	 that	 the	No	campaigners	 introduced	arguments	
that	were	neither	grounded	 in	nor	part	of	 the	 treaties.26	Brendan	Kiely,	Chief	 Executive	of	 Irish	
Alliance	 for	 Europe,	 gave	 examples	 of	 such	 arguments,	 that	 the	 Irish	Constitution	would	die	 or	
that	 Ireland	 would	 fail	 to	 attract	 foreign	 direct	 investment.27	 Dick	 Roche,	 Minister	 of	 Europe,	
stated	his	frustration	similarly:	‘They	always	come	up,	Ireland	will	lose	neutrality,	no	we	have	not,	
Ireland	will	 lose	 its	character,	no	we	have	not,	we	will	be	subsumed	in	Europe,	no	we	have	not,	
we	 will	 lose	 our	 culture,	 no	 we	 have	 not’.28	 Brigid	 Laffan,	 Chairperson	 of	 Ireland	 for	 Europe,	
characterized	 the	 No	 campaign	 themes	 such	 as	 abortion	 and	 neutrality	 as	 Ireland’s	 ‘neuralgic	
issues’.29		
	 While	 the	No	 side	 effectively	 attached	 these	unpopular	 issues	 to	 the	 EU	 treaties	 in	 the	
first	 rounds,	 without	 exception	 all	 campaigners	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 Yes	 side	 was	 better	
prepared	in	the	second	rounds.		
	 	
                                                
22	Interview,	28	April	2011.	
23	Interview,	19	April	2011.	
24	Interview,	2	May	2011.	
25	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
26	Interview,	19	April	2011.	
27	Interview,	28	April	2011.	
28	Interview,	27	April	2011.	
29	Interview,	29	April	2011.	
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The	second	campaign	
The	 governments,	 the	 Yes	 side	 political	 parties	 and	 civil	 society	 groups	 devoted	 much	 more	
energy	to	the	second	campaigns	and	employed	two	new	strategies	 to	 reverse	the	verdicts.30	To	
begin	 with	 the	 first	 strategy,	 the	 ‘guarantees’	 defined	 the	 campaign	 ground	 differently	 in	 the	
second	 rounds.	 This	 strategy	 originates	 from	 Denmark	 as	 they	 witnessed	 the	 first	 double	
referendum.	Niels	Helveg	Petersen,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	(1993),	explained	the	rationale:31			
The	 second	 time	around,	we	had	 to	 stress	again	and	again	 that	we	were	voting	on	
something	new.	 It	was	 the	Maastricht	Treaty	Plus.	 It	was	a	new	 foundation	 for	our	
membership.	The	second	round’s	difficulty	was	answering	to	‘Why	do	you	not	accept	
the	No	vote?’.	Therefore,	it	was	very	important	to	stress	that	it	was	something	new	
to	justify	a	second	round.		
	
Similarly,	 Charlotte	 Antonsen,	 Liberal	 Party	 MP,	 stated:	 ‘Denmark	 had	 to	 come	 up	 with	
something:	 the	 opt-outs.	 We	 said	 to	 the	 Danes	 that	 we	 would	 not	 go	 further	 on	 those	 four	
themes,	unless	they	would	say	Yes	to	them	in	another	referendum’.32	 Jørgen	Ørstrøm	Møller	of	
the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 added:	 ‘The	 Edinburgh	 Agreements	 was	 actually	 a	 contract	
between	the	political	elite	and	the	population,	saying	“We	understood	your	message”’.33	Mogens	
Lykketoft,	Social	Democrat	MP,	explained	that	in	the	face	of	these	guarantees,	the	No	side	could	
not	credibly	make	the	same	arguments	again.34	He	added:	‘The	second	round	was	won	due	to	the	
opt-outs.	It	was	not	a	very	tough	campaign’.	
The	 next	 occasion	 of	 the	 double	 referendum	 was	 the	 Nice	 Treaty	 in	 Ireland.	 Anthony	
Brown,	Director	of	Research	for	Ireland	for	Europe,	explained	that	Ireland	learned	a	key	strategy	
in	 managing	 double	 referendums	 from	 Denmark.35	 Referring	 particularly	 to	 the	 Danish	 White	
Paper	used	at	the	time	of	the	Maastricht	crisis,	Brown	explained	that	they	learned	how	securing	
guarantees	 provided	 the	 legal	 basis	 to	 ask	 the	 public	 to	 vote	 once	 again.	 He	 added	 that	 they	
                                                
30	 In	 Ireland,	the	second	round	civil	society	campaigns	were	also	helpful	 in	facilitating	cooperation	among	
the	Yes	campaign	political	parties.		
31	Interview,	2	May	2011.	
32	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
33	Interview,	10	May	2011.	
34	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
35	Interview,	20	April	2011.	
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invited	Danish	politicians	to	 Ireland	to	discuss	this	 issue.	 Joe	Costello,	Labour	MP,	explained	the	
strategy:	 ‘The	 lessons	 were	 learned.	 The	 areas	 that	 caused	 grief	 were	 identified	 and	 the	
government	 set	 about	 getting	 reassurances	 from	 the	 EU	 on	 these	 issues.	 That	 neutralized	 the	
main	 opposition	 arguments’.36	 Déirdre	 de	 Búrca	 of	 the	 Green	 Party	 mentioned	 that	 these	
guarantees	‘swallowed	people’s	worries’,	while	Timmy	Dooley,	Fianna	Fáil	MP,	stated	that	the	No	
campaigners’	 arguments	were	 ‘headed	 off	 by	 the	 guarantees’.37	 Pat	 Cox,	 Campaign	Director	 of	
Ireland	 for	 Europe,	 agreed:	 ‘The	 guarantees	 blunted	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 No	 campaign.	 They	 have	
been	robbed	of	the	battleground’.38			
The	 No	 side	 agreed	 that	 the	 guarantees	 were	 vital	 in	 the	 second	 referendums.	 In	
Denmark,	Jens-Peter	Bonde,	President	of	the	June	Movement,	said:	‘In	the	first	round,	we	set	the	
agenda:	“Union,	Yes	or	No?”	We	won,	because	we	won	the	agenda.	This	explains	why	we	lost	in	
1993.	 They	 withdrew	 the	 word	 “Union”	 from	 the	 debate.	 We	 lost	 because	 of	 the	 Edinburg	
Agreement’.39	In	Ireland,	Mary	Lou	McDonald,	Sinn	Féin	MP,	described	the	guarantees	strategy	as	
a	successful	political	device	to	assuage	and	neuter	the	No	side’s	arguments.40	Killian	Forde,	Sinn	
Féin’s	 Director	 of	 Strategy	 in	 the	 first	 Lisbon	 campaign,	 specifically	 referred	 to	 the	 problem	 of	
putting	 forward	 the	 ‘we	 can	get	 a	better	deal’	 argument	 in	 the	 first	 round.41	 This,	 according	 to	
him,	weakened	the	No	side’s	hand	 in	the	second	campaign,	now	that	 Ireland	had	a	better	deal.	
John	McGuirk,	Communications	Director	of	Libertas,	agreed:	‘Our	point	in	the	first	campaign	was	
that	we	 needed	 a	 better	 deal,	 and	we	 now	had	 a	 better	 deal.	 They	 took	 the	 negotiating	 table	
away’.42	‘This	was	it.	This	was	as	good	as	it	would	get	for	the	No	side’,	said	the	Executive	Director	
of	Libertas	Naoise	Nunn.43			
                                                
36	Interview,	15	April	2011.	
37	Interviews,	14	April	2011	and	19	April	2011.	
38	Interview,	28	April	2011.	
39	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
40	Interview,	26	April	2011.	
41	Interview,	12	April	2011.	
42	Interview,	18	April	2011.	
43	Interview,	12	April	2011.	
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There	was	a	second	strategy	that	complemented	the	first	one.	Now	that	the	guarantees	
helped	 the	 Yes	 side	 to	 not	 be	 on	 the	 defense,	 they	 chose	 to	 dramatize	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	
second	No	vote.	 In	Denmark,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	 (1992)	Uffe	Ellemann-Jensen	explained	
that	they	pitched	the	second	round	as	a	vote	on	EU	membership:44	
My	 argument	was	 ‘If	 you	 vote	 No,	 you	 have	 to	 leave	 the	 European	 Community’.	 In	
1993,	it	was	clear	that	it	was	a	second	chance	and	if	we	said	No,	then	it	would	mean	
that	the	EU	would	continue	without	us.	Then	the	No	side	backed	down,	because	it	was	
clear	that	a	majority	of	the	population	wanted	to	stay	in	the	EU.		
	
Jacob	Buksti,	Social	Democrat	MP,	confirmed:	‘The	underlining	issue	was	that	we	would	be	out’.45	
So	did	Social	Democrat	MP	Mogens	Lykketoft:	 ‘The	argument	was	there	 in	 the	second	round’.46	
Liberal	Party	MP	Charlotte	Antonsen	added:	‘It	was	the	underlying	tone’.47	Ole	Krarup,	President	
of	the	People’s	Movement	against	the	EU,	too,	highlighted	the	same	aspect:	 ‘[The	Yes	side]	was	
arguing	 that	 it	 was	 a	 referendum	 about	 Danish	 membership	 in	 the	 EU’.48	 Jens-Peter	 Bonde,	
President	 of	 the	 June	Movement,	 agreed:	 ‘The	 Yes	 side	 threatened	with	 exclusion’.49	 Holger	 K.	
Nielsen,	 Leader	 of	 the	 Socialist	 People’s	 Party,	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 new	 tone	 for	
reversing	the	vote:	‘In	the	first	round,	one	of	the	reasons	that	it	was	a	No	vote	was	because	we	
said	it	had	no	implication	for	EC	membership.	The	No	would	have	no	consequence	for	the	Danish	
position	in	the	Community’.50	In	fact,	the	Liberal	Party’s	poster	in	the	second	campaign	made	this	
point	very	clear:	‘Go	for	the	Safe	Choice,	You	Will	Not	Get	Another	Chance’.	
In	 Ireland,	 Brendan	 Halligan,	 National	 Campaign	 Coordinator	 of	 the	 Ireland	 for	 Europe,	
explained	 that	 they	 learned	 this	 strategy	 from	Denmark	 as	well,	 referring	 to	 the	Danish	White	
Paper	 that	 was	 drafted	 after	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty:	 ‘We	 constantly	made	 the	 point	 that	 if	 we	
were	 to	 vote	 No	 for	 a	 second	 time	 then	 the	 honorable	 thing	 for	 Ireland	 to	 do	 would	 be	 to	
                                                
44	Interview,	10	May	2011.	
45	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
46	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
47	Interview,	13	May	2011.	
48	Interview,	6	May	2011.	
49	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
50	Interview,	4	May	2011.	
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withdraw’.	 51	He	added:	 ‘The	first	 round	was	about	the	future	of	Europe,	 the	second	round	was	
about	the	future	of	Ireland’.	In	Fine	Gael	MP	Lucinda	Creighton’s	words:52	
There	was	a	very	 clear	undercurrent	 throughout	 the	 second	campaign	on	 the	Lisbon	
Treaty,	the	narrative	was	about	Ireland’s	place	in	the	heart	of	Europe.	...	Implicit	in	that	
was	the	question	...	do	we	want	to	be	a	semi-detached	member	or	not	a	member	at	all	
of	 the	 Union?	 Similarly,	 for	 the	 second	 Nice	 campaign	 we	 used	 the	 argument	 ‘It	 is	
better	to	be	inside’.		
	
Thomas	Broughan,	Labour	MP,	explained	this	phenomenon	as	‘more	of	the	stick	rather	than	just	
the	carrot’.53	Joe	Costello,	Labour	MP,	agreed:	‘If	we	were	to	reject	it	a	second	time,	it	would	be	
very	 hard	 to	 come	 to	 any	 other	 conclusion	 than	 that	 we	 had	 rejected	 the	 EU’.54	 Joe	 Higgins,	
Socialist	 Party	MP,	 confirmed	 that	 the	 second	 campaign	 put	 the	 emphasis	 on	 ‘membership’.55	
Similarly,	 John	 McGuirk,	 Communications	 Director	 of	 Libertas,	 characterized	 the	 second	
referendum	as	‘a	proxy	referendum	for	Ireland’s	continued	membership	in	the	EU’.56	Scott	Schittl,	
Campaign	Director	of	Cóir,	also	argued	that	the	second	round	was	about	‘being	in	the	EU’.57	
In	addition	to	this	new	emphasis	on	EU	membership,	the	Yes	campaigners	further	raised	
the	 stakes	by	 stressing	 the	economic	consequences	of	a	 second	No	vote.	 In	Denmark,	both	 the	
Liberal	Party	and	the	Social	Democrats	argued	that	a	No	vote	would	‘cost	jobs	and	investments’,	
‘cause	irreparable	damage	to	Denmark’s	economy’,	and	that	Denmark	could	not	‘afford	to	create	
uncertainty	about	the	future	of	Europe’	(Worre,	1995,	p.	243).	This	was	the	case	in	Ireland	as	well.	
In	the	second	Nice	referendum,	the	Yes	side	emphasized	the	negative	consequences	of	a	No	vote	
concerning	 jobs,	 growth	 and	 Ireland’s	 future	 (Hobolt,	 2009).	 David	 O’Sullivan,	 the	 Secretary-
General	of	the	European	Commission	and	an	Irishman,	stated:	‘There	is	no	Plan	B.	Not	because	we	
are	trying	to	hide	something	or	are	not	clever	enough	to	devise	one,	but	because	a	No	vote	will	
create	a	political	crisis	with	consequences	that	we	cannot	foresee’	(Costello,	2005,	p.	376).	Adrian	
                                                
51	Interview,	11	April	2011.	
52	Interview,	19	April	2011.	
53	Interview,	27	April	2011.	
54	Interview,	15	April	2011.	
55	Interview,	13	April	2011.	
56	Interview,	18	April	2011.	
57	Interview,	26	April	2011.	
 15 
Langan,	the	campaign	manager	of	the	Irish	Alliance	for	Europe,	similarly	said:	‘We	structured	our	
campaign	around	the	theme	of	consequence	...	In	Nice	I	people	had	not	been	told	that	there	were	
consequences	of	voting	No.	...	So	there	was	an	element	of	threat,	but	the	threat	was	real’.	58	This,	
they	 tried	 to	achieve,	by	 combining	 the	moral	 arguments	on	 the	enlargement	process	with	 the	
negative	consequences	of	a	No	vote	(Hobolt,	2009).59	
Similarly,	in	Lisbon	II,	the	Yes	side	used	the	unfolding	economic	crisis	to	further	dramatize	
the	consequences	of	a	No	vote.	Ireland’s	economy	worsened	between	2008	and	2009.	While	the	
first	campaign	witnessed	talk	of	a	possible	slowing	of	growth	and	a	‘soft	landing’,	such	talk	came	
to	an	abrupt	end	only	three	months	after	the	first	referendum	(O'Riain,	2014,	p.	236).	Ireland	was	
in	 full-blown	crisis	by	September	2008	and	 the	Yes	 side	decided	 to	present	 the	Yes	vote	as	 the	
only	 solution	 to	 the	 severe	 economic	 situation.	 The	 crisis	 gave	 them	 an	 additional	 chance	 to	
control	 the	 risk	 factor,	 which	 was	 absent	 in	 the	 first	 round.	 Fine	 Gael	 MP	 Lucinda	 Creighton	
explained	that	the	first	round	Yes	messages	had	an	aspirational	and	abstract	tone	and	that	they	
‘went	back	to	basics’	for	the	second	campaign	with	a	more	economy-based	argumentation.60	Joe	
Costello,	Labour	MP,	agreed:	‘We	export	about	90%	of	our	products,	so	we	badly	need	markets,	
and	 this	was	not	 the	 time	 to	be	 leaving	 the	 common	market’.61	 This	 shift	was	 indeed	 visible	 in	
second	round	Yes	slogans:	‘Yes	for	Jobs’	or	‘Ruin	versus	Recovery’.	
This	 time	 the	 No	 campaigners	 complained	 that	 the	 Yes	 side	 was	 distracting	 from	 the	
treaty	by	bringing	in	themes	such	as	‘jobs’	which	did	not	belong	to	the	text.	Socialist	Party	MP	Joe	
Higgins	 described	 the	 Yes	 campaign	 as	 a	 ‘campaign	 of	 fear	 and	distortion’.62	 Killian	 Forde,	 Sinn	
Féin’s	 Director	 of	 Strategy,	 said:	 ‘There	 was	 a	 lot	 of	 discussion	 on	 whether	 Ireland	 would	 get	
kicked	out	of	Europe	and	on	jobs,	jobs,	jobs’.63	President	of	Libertas	Declan	Ganley	characterized	
                                                
58	Quoted	in	(Hobolt,	2009,	p.	192).	
59	 This	moral	 argument,	mentioned	 by	 all	 of	my	 Irish	 interviewees,	was	 that	 Ireland,	which	 benefited	 so	
much	from	the	EU,	was	now	blocking	the	entry	of	poor	countries	that	suffered	under	the	communist	rule.		
60	Interview,	19	April	2011.	
61	Interview,	15	April	2011.	
62	Interview,	13	April	2011.	
63	Interview,	12	April	2011.	
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the	second	Yes	campaign’s	message	as	‘If	you	do	not	agree	with	this,	the	country	will	sink’.64	Mary	
Lou	McDonald,	Sinn	Féin	MP,	similarly	noted:	‘They	said	if	you	wanted	an	economic	future	in	this	
country,	you	had	no	option	but	to	support	this	treaty’.65	John	McGuirk,	Communications	Director	
of	 Libertas,	 agreed:	 ‘Essentially,	 there	 is	 very	 little	 you	can	do	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	entire	political	
establishment	saying	you	do	this	or	you	are	ruined.	There	was	no	argument	that	we	could	make	
effectively	in	response	to	it’.66	Eoin	Ó'Broin,	Campaign	Director	of	the	Sinn	Féin,	added:67	
We	 found	 it	 incredibly	 difficult	 to	 have	 the	 same	 debate.	 The	 Yes	 campaign	 did	
brilliantly,	in	the	same	way	we	set	the	debate	in	the	first	round,	they	set	the	terms	of	
the	debate	the	second	time	around	the	economic	stability	and	the	future	of	the	state.	
It	became	a	tacit	argument	which	is	‘we	are	a	small	country,	we	cannot	afford	to	take	
risky	decisions	as	we	did	in	the	first	round’.		
	
In	addition,	 in	 Ireland,	the	Yes	side	made	subtle	but	 important	changes	to	the	campaign	
environment.	 In	 the	 second	 Nice	 campaign,	 the	 government	 stopped	 the	 Referendum	
Commission	from	presenting	arguments	for	and	against	the	referendum	proposals,	which	was	an	
important	asset	for	the	No	campaigners	in	the	first	round	(Hobolt,	2009,	p.	191).68	Similarly,	in	the	
second	Lisbon	campaign,	the	No	side	lost	a	key	platform	to	present	their	arguments.	The	National	
Forum	on	Europe,	established	in	the	aftermath	of	the	first	Nice	referendum,	ran	regular	debates	
between	political	parties	and	civil	society	groups	across	Ireland.	The	government	decided	to	close	
this	forum	between	the	two	Lisbon	referendums.		
Overall,	 the	No	 campaigners	 acknowledged	 the	difference	 these	 strategies	made	 in	 the	
second	campaign.	 In	Denmark,	 Jens-Peter	Bonde,	President	of	the	June	Movement,	said:	 ‘In	the	
second	round,	the	government	and	the	Yes	side	were	mobilized	and	they	changed	the	agenda.	...	
We	 had	 no	 chance’.69	 Referring	 to	 the	 Irish	 double	 referendums,	 he	 added:	 ‘This	 is	 always	 the	
case	 in	the	second	rounds’.	 In	 Ireland,	Mary	Lou	McDonald,	Sinn	Féin	MP,	referred	to	the	same	
issue:	 ‘We	 ran	 into	 that	 wall’,	 adding	 that	 those	 walls	 were	 identical	 in	 the	 Nice	 and	 Lisbon	
                                                
64	Interview,	20	April	2011.	
65	Interview,	26	April	2011.	
66	Interview,	18	April	2011.	
67	Interview,	29	April	2011.	
68 Interview	with	Anthony	Coughlan,	National	Platform,	14	April	2011. 
69	Interview,	3	May	2011.	
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referendums.70	While	 Scott	 Schittl,	 Campaign	 Director	 of	 Cóir,	 characterized	 the	 second	 Lisbon	
campaign	as	‘David	versus	10	Goliaths’,	Declan	Ganley	similarly	said:	‘We	knew	we	would	not	win	
the	second	time’.71		
	
The	Impact	on	Public	Opinion	
From	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 campaigners,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 rounds	 is	
remarkable,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 quite	 similar	 in	 all	 three	 instances.	 Below	 I	 discuss	 the	
significance	 of	 these	 campaign	 strategies	 for	 the	 public.	 Data	 on	 the	 Lisbon	 referendums	 are	
relatively	more	 detailed	 and	 helpful	 in	 observing	 the	 impact	 of	 these	 strategies.	 To	 begin	with	
aggregate-level	data,	Table	3	shows	that	the	No	campaigners	succeeded	in	raising	doubts	on	their	
themes	in	Lisbon	I.	A	substantial	majority	of	No	voters	believed	that	the	treaty	would	compromise	
Ireland’s	neutrality,	 interfere	 into	 its	abortion	and	tax	 laws,	decrease	 Ireland’s	power	 in	 the	EU,	
and	cause	unemployment,	even	though	some	of	these	themes	were	not	related	to	the	treaty.		
	
Table	3	here	
	
In	 the	 second	 round,	 the	 Yes	 side	 diffused	 the	 contention	 around	 these	 controversial	 No	
campaign	 themes.	 Sinnott	 and	 Elkink	 (2010)	 ask	 direct	 questions	 on	 the	 guarantees.	 Table	 4	
confirms	 that	 a	 significant	 majority	 of	 the	 voters	 agreed	 that	 the	 guarantees	 protected	 Irish	
interests.	
	
Table	4	here	
	
When	 looked	at	which	 group	of	 voters	 switched	 in	 the	 second	 round,	 87%	of	 2008	Yes	
voters	voted	Yes	again	in	2009	(Sinnott	et	al.,	2010).	Thus	the	main	shift	was	on	the	No	side;	25%	
of	 2008	 No	 voters	 shifted	 to	 the	 Yes	 side.	 The	 Eurobarometer	 (2009)	 asked	 respondents	 the	
reasons	behind	their	switch.	The	two	main	reasons	provided	for	a	switch	from	a	No	vote	to	a	Yes	
vote	 or	 from	 abstention	 to	 a	 Yes	 vote	 are,	 first	 that	 the	 treaty	would	 help	 Irish	 economy,	 and	
                                                
70	Interview,	26	April	2011.	
71	Interviews,	26	April	2011	and	20	April	2011.	
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second	 that	 it	 would	 be	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 Ireland.	 This	 is	 broadly	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Yes	
campaign’s	 new	 emphasis	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	 second	No	 vote.	Media	 content	 data	 also	
parallel	these	findings.	A	comparative	content	analysis	of	the	Irish	newspaper	coverage	finds	that	
the	attention	on	economy/employment	more	 than	doubled	 in	 the	 second	 round,	 reflecting	 the	
new	emphasis	in	the	Yes	campaign	(Gora,	2010).72	
	 Importantly,	 individual-level	 data	 confirm	 these	 patterns,	 controlling	 for	 alternative	
explanations	such	as	socioeconomic	factors,	party	identification,	level	of	knowledge,	and	attitudes	
towards	the	government	and	the	Union	(Sinnott	et	al.,	2010).	This	multivariate	regression	analysis	
shows	 that	 awareness	 of	 guarantees	 on	 the	 Commissioner	 and	 taxation	 was	 associated	 with	
voting	Yes.	As	 for	 the	 success	of	 the	 second	 strategy,	 the	 same	 study	 confirms	 that	 the	overall	
positive	 evaluation	 of	 Ireland’s	 EU	 membership,	 and	 the	 expectation	 that	 the	 Yes	 vote	 would	
lessen	Ireland’s	economic	problems	were	the	two	key	factors	explaining	the	Yes	vote,	even	when	
all	the	mentioned	control	variables	are	taken	into	consideration.	The	first	one	was	an	important	
factor	in	the	first	Lisbon	referendum	as	well.	This	shows	that	the	second	factor,	relating	the	vote	
to	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 benefited	 the	 Yes	 campaigners	 immensely.	 The	 influence	 of	 these	
strategies	 is	 also	 visible	 when	 looked	 at	 the	 ‘switchers’.	 2008	 No	 voters	 who	 were	 concerned	
about	the	loss	of	Irish	neutrality	were	more	likely	to	switch	to	a	Yes	vote	in	2009,	pointing	to	the	
success	of	EU	guarantee	on	this	issue.	Once	again,	with	all	the	control	variables	in	place,	the	same	
two	factors	that	explain	the	Yes	vote	in	2009,	the	positive	evaluation	of	EU	membership	and	the	
expectation	 that	 the	 Yes	 vote	would	 decrease	 Ireland’s	 economic	 problems,	were	 also	 the	 key	
factors	explaining	 the	 switch	 from	a	No	vote	 in	2008	 to	a	Yes	vote	 in	2009.	 Therefore,	data	on	
Lisbon	referendums	reveal	that	the	Yes	side’s	new	strategies	had	a	considerable	impact	on	public	
opinion.		
	 When	looked	at	the	Nice	referendums,	 in	the	first	round,	39%	of	the	No	voters	rejected	
the	treaty	because	of	‘lack	of	information’,	16%	due	to	‘loss	of	sovereignty’,	and	12%	in	relation	to	
                                                
72	This	study	covers	the	 Irish	 Independent,	 the	 Irish	Times,	and	the	Evening	Herald,	 in	the	week	preceding	
each	referendum.		
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‘neutrality	and	military	issues’	(Sinnott,	2001).	Paralleling	Lisbon	I,	the	first	No	campaign’s	themes	
are	directly	reflected	in	the	Irish	voters’	answers.	A	multivariate	regression	analysis	also	specifies	
factors	 such	 as	 dissatisfaction	 with	 EU	 decision-making,	 neutrality,	 opposition	 to	 enlargement,	
and	 the	 feeling	 that	 ‘big	 countries	 have	 far	 too	much	 power’	 as	 determinants	 of	 the	 No	 vote	
(Sinnott,	 2001).	 In	 the	 second	 round,	 the	 reasons	 for	 voting	 No	 were	 different,	 as	 Table	 5	
demonstrates.	While	lack	of	information	and	loss	of	sovereignty	lost	importance	as	causes	to	vote	
No,	neutrality	remained	as	an	issue	for	the	No	voters	(Sinnott,	2003).		
Table	5	here	
	
However,	 in	multivariate	 regression	 analyses,	when	 compared	 to	 the	 first	 round,	 the	 impact	 of	
the	 attitudes	 towards	 neutrality	 became	 less	 important	 in	 determining	 the	 vote	 choice	 in	 the	
second	 round	 (Garry	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 In	 the	 second	 referendum,	 those	who	 favored	 limiting	 Irish	
neutrality	 were	 15	 percentage	 points	 more	 likely	 to	 vote	 Yes	 than	 those	 who	 favored	
strengthening	Irish	neutrality,	whereas	this	figure	was	29	percentage	points	in	the	first	round.	This	
finding	confirms	that	the	Seville	Declaration	rendered	this	issue	less	problematic	for	the	voters	in	
the	second	vote.		
The	 existing	 data	 is	 not	 suitable	 to	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 second-round	 argument	
concerning	 Ireland’s	 possible	 exclusion	 from	 the	 Union.	 However,	 in	 a	 multivariate	 regression	
analysis,	Hobolt	(2009)	finds	that	attitudes	towards	the	EU	membership	(pro-integration)	became	
more	 important	 in	determining	 the	Yes	 vote	 in	 the	 second	Nice	 referendum,	 linking	 this	 to	 the	
success	 of	 the	 Yes	 side	 in	 setting	 the	 agenda.	 Particularly,	 attitudes	 towards	 enlargement	
influenced	the	likelihood	of	voting	Yes	 in	the	second	round,	which	is	 in	 line	with	the	Yes	camp’s	
strategy	to	couple	the	consequences	of	a	second	No	vote	with	moral	arguments	on	enlargement	
(Garry	et	al.,	2005).	Overall,	58%	of	the	switch	from	the	No	vote	to	a	Yes	vote	was	caused	by	first-
round	abstainers	voting	Yes	in	the	second	round,	and	42%	from	first-round	No	voters	shifting	to	
the	Yes	side	in	the	second	referendum	(Hobolt,	2009).	Furthermore,	the	‘switchers’	who	changed	
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their	position	to	Yes	were	more	pro-European	than	the	consistent	No	voters	(Hobolt,	2009).	This	
suggests	that	the	Yes	side’s	new	strategies	arguably	had	an	impact.	
Finally,	 when	 looked	 at	 the	Maastricht	 referendums,	 in	 the	 first	 round,	 43%	 of	 the	 No	
voters	rejected	the	treaty	because	of	 ‘surrender	of	sovereignty’,	14%	due	to	the	 ‘federal	Union’	
idea,	13%	 in	opposition	 to	 common	defense	policy,	11%	because	 ‘the	EC	 should	not	determine	
Danish	 law’,	and	another	11%	to	protect	Danish	 identity	 (Hobolt,	2006).	These	answers	confirm	
that	the	No	campaign	was	successful	in	planting	their	arguments	in	Danes’	minds,	just	as	in	Nice	I	
and	Lisbon	I.	In	the	second	round	however,	the	guarantees	helped	the	Yes	side.	62%	reported	to	
have	 knowledge	of	 the	Edinburg	Agreement	 (Siune	et	 al.,	 1994).	More	 importantly,	 44%	of	 the	
voters	thought	that	the	second	referendum	offered	them	a	new	basis	to	vote	on	(Worre,	1995).	
24%	of	the	voters	who	had	voted	No	in	1992	believed	that	there	was	a	new	issue	to	vote	on	in	the	
second	round,	and	40%	of	this	group	changed	from	a	No	vote	to	a	Yes	vote.	While	this	constitutes	
a	 small	 percentage	 of	 the	 overall	 voting	 population,	 this	 was	 the	 decisive	 group.	 Importantly,	
Hobolt	 (2006)	 notes	 that	 people	 who	 switched	 to	 Yes	 were	 more	 exposed	 to	 campaign	
information.	
	 As	 for	 the	second	strategy,	 in	 the	1992	 referendum,	where	EU	membership	was	not	on	
the	 agenda,	 half	 of	 the	 No	 voters	 stated	 that	 they	 would	 have	 voted	 Yes,	 ‘if	 they	 expected	 a	
rupture	with	the	EC’	as	a	consequence	of	a	No	vote	(Worre,	1995,	p.	252).	In	the	second	round,	
the	Yes	campaign	ensured	that	withdrawal	from	the	EU	was	a	theme.	Indeed,	those	who	feared	a	
genuine	exclusion	from	the	Union	increased	from	14%	in	1992	to	21%	in	1993	(Worre,	1995).	This	
strategy	thus	arguably	helped	the	switch	from	the	No	side	to	the	Yes	side.	As	Siune	et	al.	(1994,	p.	
115)	 conclude,	 Denmark’s	 switch	 from	 No	 to	 Yes	 ‘was	 primarily	 caused	 by	 the	 Edinburgh	
Agreement	 and	 a	 feeling	 of	 insecurity	 about	 Denmark’s	 future	 position	 in	 Europe	 following	 a	
second	No’.	
	 Nevertheless,	 two	methodological	 limitations	 should	be	 stressed.	First,	without	detailed	
panel	 data	 focusing	 on	 ‘switchers’	 and	 their	 campaign	 exposure,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 demonstrate	 the	
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causal	 link	between	campaign	strategies	and	public	opinion,	as	also	highlighted	by	the	literature	
(Hobolt,	2006,	2009).	But	the	existing	data	strongly	suggests	that	these	strategies	had	an	impact	
on	public	opinion	and	helped	the	Yes	sides	in	reversing	the	negative	verdicts.	Second,	there	were	
numerous	factors	that	played	into	the	switch	from	a	No	vote	to	a	Yes	vote.	The	level	of	turnout	
and	the	composition	of	the	Yes	and	No	camps	were	not	identical	in	the	first	and	second	rounds	of	
the	Maastricht	and	Nice	double	referendums.	Yet,	a	detailed	debate	in	the	literature	linked	these	
factors	 to	 the	 campaigns	 (e.g.	 Gilland,	 2004;	 Hobolt,	 2006;	 Holmes,	 2005;	 Laffan	 et	 al.,	 2005;	
Sinnott,	2001,	2003;	Svensson,	2002).	Hobolt	(2006)	shows	that	the	switch	of	the	Danish	Socialist	
People’s	Party	from	the	No	side	to	the	Yes	side	strengthened	the	second	Yes	campaign	and	their	
argument	 that	 the	 Edinburgh	 Agreement	 differed	 substantially	 from	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty.	
Similarly,	in	the	Nice	double	referendum,	research	related	the	low	turnout	rate	to	the	absence	of	
any	 sense	 of	 urgency	 in	 the	 first	 Yes	 campaign	 and	 emphasized	 the	 second	 Yes	 campaign’s	
generation	of	a	sense	of	national	crisis	and	urgency	(Laffan	et	al.,	2005,	p.	8).	The	Lisbon	case,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 witnessed	 severe	 economic	 crisis	 in	 the	 second	 round.	 Here	 too,	 my	 analysis	
demonstrates	 that	 the	 campaigners	 tied	 the	 Yes	 vote	 to	 the	 recovery	 from	 the	 deepening	
economic	 crisis.	 Future	 research	 should	 analyze	 the	 interaction	 of	 these	 factors	with	 campaign	
strategies	with	better	data.		
	
Conclusion	
The	existing	studies	of	double	referendums	show	that	citizens	are	capable	of	voting	 in	 line	with	
their	interests	concerning	Europe	but	that	campaigns	determine	the	degree	to	which	they	do	so	
(Hobolt,	2009).	Being	the	first	study	to	analyze	campaign	strategies	and	materials	systematically	
across	 all	 three	 instances	 of	 double	 referendums,	 this	 research	 takes	 a	 step	 further	 and	 shows	
that	Danish	and	 Irish	elites	used	very	similar	 strategies.	 In	 the	 first	 rounds,	as	expected,	 the	No	
campaigners	 skillfully	 raised	doubts	 in	 the	public’s	mind.	But	 the	Yes	campaigners	 learned	 from	
past	 experience	 and	 built	 a	 toolkit	 for	 reversing	 the	 negative	 verdicts.	 Focusing	 on	 specific	
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campaign	arguments,	 slogans	and	materials,	 and	using	detailed	 interview	data	 thus	allow	us	 to	
take	a	step	back	and	understand	the	logic	of	campaign	actors.					
	 Nonetheless,	there	are	other	aspects	of	learning	as	well.	During	the	first	Lisbon	campaign,	
Irish	No	campaigners	explicitly	stressed	that	Ireland	could	get	a	better	deal	after	a	rejection.	They	
learned	that	there	would	be	a	second	round,	where	they	would	receive	concessions	from	the	EU.	
This	 has	 implications,	 signaling	 a	 new	 form	 of	 negotiation	 power	 for	 small	 member	 states	 in	
guiding	European	integration.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Yes	side	did	not	learn	from	its	Nice	Treaty	
experience	 and	 repeated	 the	 same	 mistakes	 in	 the	 first	 Lisbon	 campaign.	 This	 is	 not	 very	
surprising	 because	 being	 a	 distant	 and	 complex	 entity,	 the	 EU	 is	 particularly	 susceptible	 to	
negative	 arguments.	 Moreover,	 the	 No	 side	 holds	 the	 advantage	 in	 referendum	 campaigns.		
‘Guarantees’	 or	 ‘consequences	 of	 a	 rejection’	 are	 therefore	 not	 easy	 to	 bring	 up	 in	 the	 first	
rounds,	which	might	partly	explain	the	repetition	of	campaign	mistakes.	
	 The	broader	issue	of	democratic	participation	also	deserves	attention.	Socialist	Party	MP	
Joe	Higgins	asked:	 ‘The	whole	question	 is	how	democratic	this	 is,	making	people	vote	until	 they	
deliver	the	right	result	for	the	establishment’.73	Similarly,	Sinn	Féin	MP	Mary	Lou	McDonald	said:	
‘If	you	get	a	Yes	that	is	the	right	answer,	if	you	get	a	No	that	is	the	wrong	answer’.74	But	a	senior	
EU	official	 disagreed:	 ‘If	 26	 countries	 say	 Yes	 and	one	 country	 says	No,	what	does	 it	 say	 about	
democracy?	Why	are	the	26	countries	penalized?	It	is	not	unreasonable	to	turn	around	to	the	No-
voting	 country	 and	 ask	 what	 went	 wrong	 and	 address	 the	 problem’.75	 What	 we	 witness	 is	
therefore	a	clash	between	direct	democracy	in	one	country	and	representative	democracy	for	the	
whole	Union,	 and	more	 particularly	 the	 question	of	who	 should	 compose	 the	 demos	 for	 these	
types	of	decisions	(Altman,	2010,	p.	25).		
However,	as	Brendan	Halligan	put	it:	‘If	Denmark	wants	to	leave	the	EU,	nobody	is	going	
to	stop	them,	it	is	not	a	big	deal.	If	Ireland	wants	leave	the	EU,	nobody	is	going	to	stop	us,	it	is	not	
                                                
73	Interview,	13	April	2011.	
74	Interview,	26	April	2011.	
75	Interview	with	Richard	Corbett,	27	May	2013.	
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a	big	deal.	But	if	France	votes	No,	that	is	that,	there	is	no	EU	without	France.	As	Orwell	famously	
said,	 some	are	more	equal	 than	others’.76	This	 implies	 that	direct	democracy	does	not	 function	
uniformly	across	the	Union.	Depending	on	their	size,	member	states	need	different	strategies	 in	
using	the	referendum	mechanism	on	European	Union	questions.		 	
                                                
76	Interview,	11	April	2011.	
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		 TEU	I	 TEU	II	 Nice	I	 Nice	II	 Lisbon	I	 Lisbon	II	
Date	 2	June		
1992	
18	May	
1993	
7	June	
2001	
19	October	
2002	
12	June	
2008	
2	October	
2009	
Yes	vote	(%)	 49.3	 56.7	 46.1	 62.9	 46.6	 67.1	
No	vote	(%)	 50.7	 43.3	 53.9	 37.1	 53.4	 32.9	
Turnout	(%)	 83.1	 86.5	 34.8	 49.5	 53.1	 59	
Table	1:	Results	of	double	EU	referendums	
	
		 TEU	I	 TEU	II	 Nice	I	 Nice	II	 Lisbon	I	 Lisbon	II	
Conservative	Party	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Center	Democrats	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Liberal	Party	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Social	Liberals	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Social	Democrats	 Yes	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Socialist	People’s	Party	 No	 Yes	 	 	 	 	
Progress	Party	 No	 No	 	 	 	 	
Fianna	Fáil	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Fine	Gael	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Labour	Party	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Progressive	Democrats	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Green	Party	 	 	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Sinn	Féin	 	 	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Socialist	Party	 	 	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Table	2:	Vote	recommendation	of	the	political	parties	in	the	first	and	second	rounds	
	
	If	the	Treaty	had	been	passed,	do	you	think	it	would	have…?	 Yes	
voters	
(%)	
No	
Voters	
(%)	
Compromised	Ireland’s	neutrality	 30	 70	
Made	the	practice	of	abortion	more	likely	in	Ireland	 26	 74	
Led	to	a	change	in	tax	on	business	 33	 67	
Reduced	Ireland’s	influence	on	EU	decisions	 33	 67	
Strengthened	the	protection	of	workers’	rights	 72	 28	
Cause	even	more	unemployment	 19	 81	
Led	to	losing	our	EU	Commissioner	for	some	of	the	time	 48	 52	
Simplified	decision	making	in	the	EU	 66	 24	
Source:	RedC	Research	
Table	3:		Agreement	with	No	campaign	themes	in	Lisbon	I	
	
Do	you	think	with	the	guarantees	…	?	 All	voters	
(%)	
Yes	voters	(%)	 No	voters	
(%)	
Ireland	will	remain	in	control	of	its	own	taxes	 77	 85	 64	
Ireland	retains	control	of	its	abortion	laws	 82	 85	 74	
Ireland	will	keep	its	Commissioner	 87	 90	 79	
Source:	(Sinnott	&	Elkink,	2010)	
Table	4:		Perceptions	of	guarantees	in	Lisbon	II	
	
	
	 Nice	I	
(%)	
Nice	II	
(%)	
Lack	of	information	 39	 14	
Loss	of	sovereignty	 16	 8	
Neutrality	and	military	issues	 12	 17	
Bad	idea	in	general	 7	 25	
						Source:	(Sinnott,	2003)	
Table	5:	Reasons	for	voting	No	in	Nice	I	and	Nice	II	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Campaign	posters	in	Maastricht,	Nice	and	Lisbon	referendums	
(Top	row	first	round,	bottom	row	second	round)	
 
